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Business-cycle phenomenon has long been regarded as an empirical curiosity in macroeconomics.
Regarding its causes, recent evidence suggests that economic oscillations are engendered by fluctua-
tions in the level of entrepreneurial activity[1, 2]. Opportunities promoting such activity are known
to be embedded in social network structures[3, 4]. However, predominant understanding of the
dynamics of economic oscillations originates from stylised pendulum models on aggregate macroe-
conomic variables[5, 6], which overlook the role of social networks to economic activity—echoing
the so-called aggregation problem of reconciling macroeconomics with microeconomics[7, 8]. Here
I demonstrate how oscillations can arise in a networked economy epitomised by an industry known
as multi-level marketing or MLM[9], the lifeblood of which is the profit-driven interactions among
entrepreneurs. Quarterly data (over a decade) which I gathered from public MLMs reveal oscillatory
time-series of entrepreneurial activity that display nontrivial scaling and persistence[10, 11]. I found
through a stochastic population-dynamic model, which agrees with the notion of profit maximisation
as the organising principle of capitalist enterprise, that oscillations exhibiting those characteristics
arise at the brink of a critical balance between entrepreneurial activation and inactivation brought
about by a homophily-driven network effect. Oscillations develop because of stochastic tunnelling
permitted through the destabilisation by noise of an evolutionarily stable state. The results fit
altogether as evidence to the Burns-Mitchell conjecture that economic oscillations must be induced
by the workings of an underlying “network of free enterprises searching for profit”[12]. I anticipate
that the findings, interpreted under a mesoeconomic framework[13], could open a viable window for
scrutinising the nature of business oscillations through the lens of the emerging field of network sci-
ence. Enquiry along these lines could shed further light into the network origins of the business-cycle
phenomenon.
Known widely in literature as network marketing,
MLM executes through embedded social networks its
essential business functions such as goods distribution,
consumption, marketing, and direct selling[9, 14]. That
makes MLM a stark microcosm of a networked econ-
omy. One salient yet so far overlooked feature of
MLM dynamics is the aperiodic oscillations in firm size
N(t), quantified by the number of participating en-
trepreneurs (Fig. 1). Empirical quarterly firm-size data
have been collected from four public MLMs (Supple-
mentary Data; Supplementary Methods, S1): NuSkin
Enterprises (NUS), Nature Sunshine (NATR), USANA
Health Sciences (USNA), and Mannatech Inc. (MTEX).
Publicly-listed firms are chosen because they are required
to disclose accurate business data on a regular basis.
The average revenue (i.e., total revenue divided by N for
any given quarter) does not proportionately rise with N
(Fig. 1c,d), implying that firm-size expansion does not
inevitably translate into revenue growth. Firm size is
thus a more reliable quantifier for entrepreneurial activ-
ity than is total revenue.
The scaling property of the N(t) time-series is exam-
ined via Hurst analysis[10, 11] (Methods; Supplementary
Methods, S1). The Hurst exponents, H(1) and H(2),
quantify the scaling of the absolute increments and of
the power spectrum, respectively. If time series were
generated by a Wiener process, such as in the Black-
Scholes model[15], then H(1) = 0.5. But H(1) > 0.5
indicates persistence, i.e., changes in one direction usu-
ally occur in consecutive periods; whereas H(1) < 0.5
suggests anti-persistence, i.e., changes in opposite di-
rections usually appear in sequence[11]. Ideally, a sin-
gle scaling regime means H(1) = H(2), which applies
to time-series generated by unifractal processes such as
the Wiener process and the fractal Brownian motion.
Table 1 presents Hurst exponents for different MLMs.
Generally, H(1) > 0.5 except for NUS North Asia and
NATR with H(1) ∼ 0.5 (within standard deviation); and
H(1) = H(2) within standard deviation. Overall, these
features of the time-series suggest that MLM firm dynam-
ics is a non-Wiener unifractal process[11]. Unifractality
implies self-similarity such that conclusions drawn at one
timescale remains statistically valid at another timescale.
An MLM firm is considered as a population of profit-
seeking entrepreneurs. This population exhibits disorder
through the presence of two entrepreneur types distin-
guished by socio-economic status (SES). Let A and B
denote these types, wherein A has higher SES than B,
and NA and NB denote their subpopulation size, respec-
tively. The total population at any given time t is thus
N(t) = N = NA + NB. Three major processes run the
population dynamics: entrepreneurial activation by re-
cruitment; competitive inactivation; and catalytic inacti-
vation due to a network effect. Recruitment is expressed
in the following reaction equations:
A
µ−→ 2A, B µ−→ B +A,
B
λ−→ 2B, A λ−→ A+B, (1)
2TABLE I. Hurst exponents H(1) and H(2) for different
MLMs estimated using the generalised Hurst method[10, 11].
H(1) > 0.5 indicates persistence, whereas H(1) < 0.5 indi-
cates anti-persistence. H(2) values, which are closely related
to the scaling of the power spectrum, are also shown. Gener-
ally, H(2) = H(1) within standard deviation. The standard
deviation values are determined from a pre-testing procedure
(Supplementary Methods, S1).
MLM H(1) H(2)
MTEX 0.8328 ± 0.1140 0.7425 ± 0.1081
USNA United States 0.7602 ± 0.1140 0.6823 ± 0.1081
USNA Canada 0.6619 ± 0.1140 0.6013 ± 0.1081
USNA SEA-Pacific 0.6383 ± 0.1140 0.6139 ± 0.1081
NUS Greater China 0.6159 ± 0.1098 0.5387 ± 0.1038
NATR 0.5128 ± 0.1032 0.5126 ± 0.0876
NUS North Asia 0.4780 ± 0.1098 0.4789 ± 0.1038
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FIG. 1. Empirical data for different publicly-listed MLM
firms. N(t) is the firm size, R(t) is average revenue per mem-
ber, and t is time in quarters. a, USANA Health Sciences
(USNA) in Canada, and Southeast Asia and Pacific (includ-
ing Australia) from March 1998 to March 2012. b, NuSkin
(NUS) in Greater China (including Hong Kong) and North
Asia (Japan and South Korea) from March 1999 to March
2012. c, Nature Sunshine (NATR) worldwide showing N and
R from September 1994 to March 2012. d, Mannatech Inc.
(MTEX) worldwide showing N and R from April 1998 to
March 2012. Data sets are provided in Supplementary Data.
wherein µ and λ are per-capita rates of recruitment of
types A and B, respectively, and µ > λ because A’s
higher SES implies a faster rate of entrepreneurial acti-
vation through the support of bigger capital and vaster
social resources. Competitive inactivation occurs due to
market overlap, or niche overlap[16], as participants can
go head-to-head over the same clientele or market. An
encounter rate δ, which can be related to the density of
the embedding social network, quantifies the probability
of market overlaps. Thus, competitive inactivation is:
Z +A
δ−→ Z, Z +B δ−→ Z for Z ∈ {A,B} . (2)
Lastly, catalytic inactivation, which denotes the network
effect (Methods), is expressed as:
Z
νΦ
−−−−−→
MLM
∅, for Z ∈ {A,B} . (3)
The network structure of the MLM catalyses inacti-
vation of existing participants at the rate ν Φ, where
Φ =
∑
Z∈{A,B}NZ (NZ − 1)
N(N − 1) is a measure of the proba-
bility that two members drawn randomly from the MLM
belong to the same type. It has been widely used in liter-
ature as a diversity index[17]. Due to interconnectedness
and homophily[22], the inactivation of one could (like a
contagion) infect another to follow suit.
Combining equations (1– 3) results to a Master equa-
tion (Supplementary Equation 1) for the state probabil-
ity density. Perturbation analysis accounts for the fluc-
tuations arising from demographic stochasticity[26]. In
terms of the system size Ω (roughly the size of that part of
the overall population considered fit for entrepreneurial
activities) the following ansatz is made: NA = Ωα+
√
Ω a
andNB = Ωβ+
√
Ω b, where α and β are the average con-
centrations, and a and b are the magnitude of the fluctua-
tions of the stochastic variables NA and NB, respectively
(Supplementary Methods, S2). The highest order in the
expansion expresses the macroscopic rate equations for α
and β:
α˙ = µ(α+ β) − ν Φ (α+ β)− δ (α+ β)α;
β˙ = λ(α + β)− ν Φ (α+ β)− δ (α+ β)β. (4)
Meanwhile, the next highest order term gives the Fokker-
Planck equation, or FPE (Supplementary Equation 2),
governing the dynamics of the probability density for the
magnitude of the fluctuations. From the FPE, the ex-
pectation values of the stationary fluctuations are 〈a〉 =
〈b〉 = 0, which supports the interpretation that the deter-
ministic solutions to (4) are the correct average values.
The model is nondimensionalised by setting the char-
acteristic timescale at tc = 5 days (Methods). Conse-
quently, the rates can be squarely related to empirical
data by rescaling to appropriate units. Dimensionless
rates take on simplified yet meaningful values: λ = 1−µ;
µ, ν ∈ (0, 1); and ∆ = utcδ
Ω
∈ (10−4, 10−3). Bifurca-
tion analysis (Supplementary Methods, S4) of the nondi-
mensionalised equation (4) unveils a bifurcation manifold
µ = µb(ν), where
µb(ν) =
1
2
+
√
(1− ν)3
27ν
, 0 < ν < 1. (5)
Equation (5) coincides with an evolutionarily stable state
(ESS) of a population game between the types (Sup-
plementary Methods, S3– S4). The fraction of A– en-
trepreneurs is xA = xA + Ω
−1/2 ξ, where xA =
α
α+ β
,
3and ξ is the fluctuation component. Analysis of the sec-
ond moments from the FPE shows that the variance di-
verges as
〈
ξ2
〉 ∼ δ |µ− µb|−1 as µ → µ−b (Supplemen-
tary Methods, S5). That is a signature of criticality
through which the ESS, where xA = x
∗ and N = N∗ =
1− 2ν Φ(x∗)
∆
, is (quite counterintuitively) destabilised as
the bifurcation manifold is approached. This mechanism
is hereby referred as stochastic tunnelling wherein noise
enables the state trajectory to cross a phase barrier that
could not have been otherwise traversed without actively
tuning the bifurcation parameter (Supplementary Meth-
ods, S4).
Stochastic tunnelling drives the business oscillations
(Fig. 2). Time series is generated by solving the model us-
ing a numerical technique, known as Gillespie’s stochas-
tic simulation algorithm[27], which directly integrates the
master equation (Supplementary Methods, S6). Diverg-
ing variance indeed allows the solution to wander far
enough from the ESS and closer to an unstable point
(UEP) which pushes that solution toward the boundary
state, where x∗ = 1 and N∗ =
µ− νΦ
∆
(Fig. 2a). That
noise also enables the solution to sling back to the ESS
consequently forming loops in the phase portrait, hence,
oscillations in the time series (Fig. 2b). The time series
consist of upswings associated with increasing diversity
and downswings with decreasing diversity, i.e., Φ → 1
as xA → 1. The remarkable observation is that recov-
ery from low points of the series coincide with periods
when A is dominant—a case of the fitter entrepreneurs
surviving through “recessions”[28].
Profit maximisation is an axiom of capitalist
enterprise[28]. MLM may enhance profitability by max-
imising the proportion of A – entrepreneurs (Supplemen-
tary Methods, S7). Thus, the time-average value 〈xA〉t
is examined for various pairs of µ and ν which conse-
quently depicts the phase diagram of the model (Fig. 3a).
Business oscillations come about as a result of stochastic
tunnelling through the critical boundary µ = µb. Phase
II, where A stably dominates (Supplementary Fig. S2b),
can be considered Pareto-optimal as the MLM maximises
profitability as a whole. But high levels of targeted re-
cruitment, i.e., µ >
4
7
, are required. Entrepreneurial ac-
tivation, however, might in reality be less discriminatory
and thus µ ≈ 1
2
, which denotes higher entropy (Supple-
mentary Discussion). The critical boundary delineates,
for any magnitude ν of the network effect, the minimum µ
that promotes long-run dominance of A – entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, a stronger network effect tends to frus-
trate that dominance as catalytic inactivation increas-
ingly outpaces activation, leading to degradation of en-
trepreneurial activity (Supplementary Fig. S2d). The
ESS at the III-IV boundary (Fig. 3a) is therefore Pareto-
dominated [29].
The Hurst maps (Fig. 3b, c) locate where the real
MLMs are on the phase diagram. The Hurst exponents
are determined from the same exact method. Clusters
appear in the vicinity of the III-IV boundary. On these
clusters H(1) and H(2) are approximately between 0.5
and 0.8, about the same range of values found in real
MLMs (see Table 1). A correlative plot (Fig. 3d) be-
tween H(1) and H(2) further confirms not only agree-
ment between model and empirical data, but also their
unifractality. Overall, these findings suggest that real-
world MLMs are Pareto-dominated economic systems[8],
which are operating in an environment characterised by
high entropy, i.e., µ ≈ 1
2
, and by a strong network effect
(i.e., ν > µ).
The study paints an illuminating insight about the na-
ture of MLM operations. MLMs have been accused in
several instances by discontent participants for ethical vi-
olations concerning its business practices[30]. The model
justifies such disgruntlement for two reasons. First,
that profit is closely associated with recruitment implies
less selective entrepreneurial activation. Second, that
recruitment proceeds through embedded networks con-
notes strong network effects. Less-fit entrepreneurs can
join the market in droves but are weeded out too soon[28]
because of the Pareto-dominated nature of the venture.
The feeling of being victimised is thus not at all surpris-
ing.
The mesoeconomic framework (i.e., linking microeco-
nomic foundations with macroeconomic phenomena[13])
puts the present study in a broader economic context.
A more network-dynamic approach to viewing business
cycles is hereby encouraged. Lastly, the mathematical
model could be extended or refined, such as by gener-
alising the network effect using the Ho¨lder mean such
that Φ(xA, xB) =
q−1
√
xqA + x
q
B, ∀q > 1 (Supplementary
Discussion, Supplementary Fig. S1); whereas empirical
data of higher temporal resolution may become available
in the future, to further test the implications that came
forth.
METHODS
Network effect.
The local network effect, which is a relatively new idea
in economics[18–21], means that the decision of one entity
can influence those by whom that entity is connected to.
Particularly, the network effect manifests through inacti-
vation as the value of exiting the enterprise is enhanced
through the catalytic action of the connections between
participants. Homophily[21, 22] spells that “a contact be-
tween similar people occurs at a higher rate than among
dissimilar people”[23], and strongly influences contagions
that diffuse through social links[24]. MLM participants
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FIG. 2. Business oscillations in the MLM. The model is sim-
ulated with the following parameters: µ = 0.57, ν = 0.57,
∆ = 5 × 10−4 for a total time of t = 240 1−day periods
≈ 1 year. a, Phase portrait showing one stochastic real-
ization for N(t) (in units u = 103) versus xA(t); ⊗ marks
the initial condition: N(0) = 400 and xA(0) = 0.54. The
dashed curves and lines are the nullclines of the replicator
equations from the evolutionary game (Supplementary Meth-
ods, S3), which intersect at the evolutionarily stable state
(ESS, •) and at an unstable equilibrium point (UEP, ◦). The
trajectory of the solution forms a loop indicating the oscilla-
tions. b, Time series for N(t) and xA(t). Hurst analysis gives
H(1) = 0.6668 ± 0.0235 and H(2) = 0.6564 ± 0.0204 for the
N(t) series.
are thus more likely to connect with others of the same
SES, consequently elevating homogeneity (or depressing
diversity) in the firm. Diversity here is measured by the
Simpson index Φ serving as a dimensionless potential
function minimised when NA = NB (at highest diver-
sity). The network effect is constituted as ν Φ, for ν > 0;
hence, the network effect is stronger at less diversity.
Hurst analysis.
The generalized Hurst method[10, 11] has been
coded by one of its authors, T. Aste. The code
was downloaded from Matlab File Exchange website,
http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/30076,
and was used with default settings in the calculation of
H(1) and H(2).
Nondimensionalisation.
Dimensionless time is defined as t̂ = t/tc, wherein
tc = (µ+ λ)
−1
. Population numbers are in units of u:
NA = N̂A u and NB = N̂B u. Consequently, equation (4)
becomes:
dN̂A
dt̂
= (µtc) N̂A − (νtc)Φ(N̂A, N̂B)
(
N̂A + N̂B
)
− (utc δ/Ω)
(
N̂A + N̂B
)
N̂A,
dN̂B
dt̂
= (λtc) N̂B − (νtc)Φ(N̂A, N̂B)
(
N̂A + N̂B
)
− (utc δ/Ω)
(
N̂A + N̂B
)
N̂B.
Characteristic timescale is chosen at tc = 5 days (i.e.,
1 month ≡ 20 days). Assuming that the system-size pa-
rameter is of the order, Ω ∼ 106 individuals, and the unit
u ∼ 103 individuals, then setting 10−4 < ∆ = u tc δ
Ω
<
10−3 implies an average per-capita encounter rate δ be-
tween 1 and 10 per month, which is a reasonable estimate.
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